Students are expected to have a solid background in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics
At the end of the course students will acquire the tools of the trade for research in microeconomic theory and its applications, with a focus on the economics of information. Students will be able to understand theoretical models dealing with strategic behavior, information transmission, and contracting in economics and other business disciplines. Students will also learn to analyze optimal contracts under different informational problems. Specifically, they will be familiar with topics concerning game theory, adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling and screening.
Game theory. Static games of complete information. Dynamic games of complete information. Static games of incomplete information. Dynamic games of incomplete information. Adverse selection. Moral hazard. Signaling.
Written exam consisting of exercises, possibly integrated by open and multiple choice questions.
If the course is delivered online (totally or partially), changes may
occur in the program and/or in the exam, in order to adapt the course to online teaching methods.